The Problem with ABA Standard 405(c) by Stanchi, Kathryn
558 
The Problem with
ABA Standard 405(c)
Kathryn Stanchi
I fi nd myself in a diffi  cult position, having been tasked with commenting on 
a “best practices” model for ABA Standard 405(c).1 I believe Professor Melissa 
Weresh’s guidelines,2 as well-thought-out and well-meaning as they are, give 
Standard 405(c) a dignity and legitimacy it doesn’t deserve. Standard 405(c) 
is a pale substitute for tenure and a damaging double standard. And, as a 
practical matter, the power to administer Standard 405(c)—and implement 
these “best practices”—will likely be in the hands of those who fought what 
little security it gives. The sad truth is that Standard 405(c), at least as it is 
currently implemented, can’t be fi xed.
Of course, I understand the practical reasons that clinicians and legal 
writing faculty would accept or even fi ght for Standard 405(c), and I certainly 
don’t blame us for grabbing it. After years of job insecurity, intellectual 
disparagement, and pay inequity, Standard 405(c) looks not too bad. 
But this essay takes the position that clinicians and legal writing faculty 
deserve better than “not too bad.” Standard 405(c) needs to be called out for 
what it is: an institutionalized bar to professional advancement divorced from 
any reasonable measure of merit.
If all law faculty members, regardless of subject matter taught, were hired 
on the same track, whether tenure or Standard 405(c), that would be diff erent. 
Or if all faculty members, regardless of subject taught, were given the option 
of tenure or Standard 405(c), that would be diff erent. Or if all law faculty 
members were hired on Standard 405(c) with tenure awarded to the most 
accomplished and productive, the standard would at least have some claim to 
surface fairness. But this isn’t how Standard 405(c) currently works. Instead, 
Standard 405(c) singles out certain faculty for lesser status based purely on 
what subject they teach. It enshrines the discriminatory notion that, regardless 
1. SECTION ON LEGAL EDUC. AND ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, AM. BAR ASS’N, ABA STANDARDS AND 
RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS 2016–2017, at 29 (2016).
2. Best Practices for Protecting Security of Position for 405(c) Faculty, 66 J. LEGAL EDUC. 538 (2017).
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of merit or accomplishment, “your kind” can go only so far. This kind of 
categorical double standard is not defensible.
Suppressing Growth and Potential
Like many categorically biased rules, Standard 405(c) is irrational. 
It artifi cially suppresses the growth and potential of certain faculty by 
discouraging them from behavior that might enhance their teaching and the 
reputations of their institutions. Standard 405(c) categorically excludes clinical 
and legal writing faculty from tenure, regardless of meritorious performance. 
Regardless of how much they publish, how well they teach, or how laudatory 
their service to the institution, they do not get tenure. Standard 405(c) brands 
clinicians and legal writing faculty as “other” and “lesser”—and as with most 
branding and categorization it is persistent. Standard 405(c)’s branding, 
therefore, discourages upward movement and embeds the existing hierarchy. 
Although psychologists may disagree about the value of status hierarchies 
within an institution, there is no support for hierarchies that “do not reward 
based on performance.”3
Under Standard 405(c), clinicians and legal writing faculty do not even get 
to compete for tenure. This institutionalized bar on advancement is based not 
on merit but on a broad categorization. Although, as noted below, this ceiling 
on advancement can inhibit excellence in all aspects of the academic job, it 
likely has the greatest inhibitory eff ect on scholarly production. Scholarship 
is time-consuming and diffi  cult, particularly for clinicians and legal writing 
faculty, whose teaching duties are labor- and time-intensive. Standard 405(c) 
does not off er the kind of institutional reward required for the production of 
scholarship, especially with the teaching loads of most clinicians and legal 
writing faculty. Moreover, Standard 405(c) gives law schools an explicit reason 
not to support clinical and legal writing scholarship. In addition, Standard 
405(c) doesn’t off er nearly the same employment protection as tenure for 
faculty who wish to say something provocative or controversial.
This is particularly illogical as scholarship is considered to be the faculty 
responsibility most connected to the prestige and reputation of the institution. 
Why wouldn’t we want a system where all players had the incentive to produce 
the most rigorous, original or analytically cogent work? But under Standard 
405(c), that is not what we have.
Clinicians and legal writing faculty cannot even compete fairly with our 
peers. As with most discriminatory practices, Standard 405(c) raises the 
question of why, given our obvious inferiority, everyone is afraid to let us 
compete. Why the need to legislate our second-class status if it is a given? The 
answer is that at some point it was decided, without a shred of support, that 
legal writing and clinics were not as rigorous, intellectually challenging, or 
valuable as other subjects. And so a vicious hierarchical cycle began.
3. Jeff rey Pfeff er & Nancy Langton, The Eff ect of Wage Dispersion on Satisfaction, Productivity, and 
Working Collaboratively: Evidence from College and University Faculty, 38 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 382, 388 
(1993) (discussing wage dispersion among faculty in the academy) (emphasis in original).
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The Category Problem
Standard 405(c) is reserved for clinical teachers and some legal writing 
faculty. Thus, at the outset, a determination is being made that certain subjects 
are less worthy of tenure, categorically. Faculty who teach “substantive” 
subjects4 are presumed to deserve tenure; clinicians and legal writing faculty 
are presumed not to deserve it. 
In reality, of course, as with all categorical thinking, Standard 405(c) is both 
under- and over-inclusive. Many clinicians and legal writing faculty—including 
those who continue to be excluded from tenure—have proved themselves, 
against all odds, to have met or exceeded the standards for tenure.5 And many 
faculty members who teach “substantive” courses—despite every advantage—
have proved themselves to be substandard or unproductive scholars, poor 
teachers, or both. I think some, perhaps many, clinicians and legal writing 
faculty have something to say that is worth listening to. And some tenure-track 
or tenured faculty may not. Isn’t the better system the one that divides people 
based on what they have to say, not one that assumes that one group does have 
something to say and the other group, categorically, does not?
Of course, all categorical thinking, based as it is on heuristic thinking, is 
susceptible to this criticism.  That doesn’t necessarily make it a bad thing. The 
mental shortcut that categories provide is necessary to keep the world from 
being overwhelmingly complicated. But here, the categorical thinking fosters 
harmful stereotypes by treating a class of people diff erently for arbitrary 
reasons.
The categorical thinking underlying Standard 405(c) makes no institutional 
sense. Because Standard 405(c) suppresses advancement for certain groups, 
the academy is depriving itself of potential excellence.6 Empirically, there is 
4. The logic of this distinction has always eluded me. Apparently, I’m not alone in my 
confusion. Hence the scare quotes. See generally Linda H. Edwards, Legal Writing: A Doctrinal 
Course, 1 SAVANNAH L. REV. 1 (2014); Linda H. Edwards, The Trouble with Categories: What Theory 
Can Teach Us about the Doctrine-Skills Divide, 64 J. LEGAL EDUC. 181 (2014).
5. Despite the lack of support and encouragement fostered by the double standard of Standard 
405(c), many clinicians and legal writing faculty have refused to be silenced and are busy 
developing and expanding their scholarly voices. This scholarship runs the gamut from 
theoretical to practical, and covers diverse subjects including pedagogy and beyond. See, 
e.g., Terrill Pollman  & Linda H. Edwards, Scholarship by Legal Writing Professors: New Voices in 
the Legal Academy, 11  LEGAL  WRITING: J. LEGAL WRITING INST. 3 (2005); Linda L. Berger et 
al., The Past, Presence, and Future of Legal Writing Scholarship: Rhetoric, Voice, and Community, 16 LEGAL 
WRITING: J. LEGAL WRITING INST. 521 (2010); ELIZABETH MERTZ, THE LANGUAGE OF LAW 
SCHOOL: LEARNING TO “THINK LIKE A LAWYER” 27 (2007) (“some of the most innovative 
ideas about improving law teaching can be found in the scholarship of clinical and legal 
writing law professors.”). In part, this is due to supportive entities like the Association of 
Legal Writing Directors, which provide scholarship support to those faculty denied it by 
their own institutions, and the Clinical Law Review, which provides a peer-edited outlet for 
clinical scholarship.
6. See Cameron Anderson & Courtney E. Brown, The Functions and Dysfunctions of Hierarchy, 30 
RES. ORG. BEHAV. 55, 76 (2010) (when lower-ranked people in a status hierarchy feel they are 
treated unfairly, they lose motivation to contribute and become less productive).
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no question that arbitrary hierarchies (those unrelated to performance) inhibit 
productivity.7 The opportunity to fairly compete might not only inspire 
clinicians and legal writing faculty to excel, but might spur other faculty to be 
better as well.8
The argument that clinical and legal writing faculty are hired based on 
“diff erent” criteria only supports my point that Standard 405(c) enshrines 
and supports an arbitrary and categorical distinction. First, it presumes that 
diff erent hiring criteria are appropriate, which I’m not sure is true. I think 
law schools, especially in these diffi  cult times, should be seriously rethinking 
their standard hiring criteria to get a little more diversity of all kinds in our 
institutions (experiential diversity; educational diversity; and racial, class, and 
gender diversity). But more important, the “diff erent criteria” argument is 
really a “lesser merit criteria” argument. It is another (perhaps politer) way of 
saying certain subjects are not as worthy and the people who teach them are 
not as excellent. This is logically fallacious. Beyond that, it is simply wrong to 
treat other human beings in such a disparaging and dismissive way.
Clinicians and legal writing faculty have much of value to impart to our 
institutions—in their scholarship, in teaching, in their connections to the 
practicing bar. And I believe that, especially in these times, when law schools 
are increasingly called upon to connect with the practicing bar, we need to 
expand our view of what good scholarship is. But Standard 405(c) allows us 
to remain stagnant, doing things just as we have always done.
But while the institutional cost of Standard 405(c) is worth noting, it 
isn’t what makes Standard 405(c) such an embarrassment. Making broad 
categorical judgments about human beings—and their value—should be 
something we do only in rare instances because of the risk of bias and damage. 
We should interrogate ourselves carefully when we are tempted to do this to 
make sure that it is a moral choice free from discriminatory eff ect. While it 
may be easier to generalize about people, lazy thinking is simply never a good 
enough reason to discriminate.
Similarly, institutional autonomy, a rationale frequently raised against 
ABA rules about treatment of faculty status, is not a persuasive argument in 
favor of Standard 405(c).9 We should be honest with ourselves about what 
this autonomy really entails: the freedom to institutionalize a discriminatory 
hierarchy. Opponents of the 1964 Civil Rights Act made similar arguments 
about that bill’s potentially devastating eff ect on the freedom of private 
7. See, e.g., Pfeff er & Langton, supra note 3, at 396 (wage dispersion negatively aff ects faculty 
productivity).
8. See, e.g., id. at 387 (tying job wages to productivity serves as an incentive for all employees to 
work harder). 
9. See Peter A. Joy & Robert R. Kuehn, The Evolution of ABA Standards for Clinical Faculty, 75 TENN. 
L. REV. 183, 197 (2008).
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businesses.10 The argument here is similar, and the answer should be the same. 
There is, or should be, no freedom to discriminate.
The Human Costs
The human cost of Standard 405(c) is real and harmful. When they are 
arbitrary or discriminatory, status hierarchies exact a serious toll on those 
upon whom they are imposed.11 Institutionalizing status also tends to be 
a self-fulfi lling prophecy, making movement from lower to higher ranks 
exceptionally diffi  cult.12 As one study put it:
[O]nce a hierarchy gets established, a number of organizational and psy-
chological processes conspire to create diff erent degrees of opportunity to . . . 
acquire more power and status for individuals and groups at diff erent levels 
of the hierarchy . . . . [T]hese processes aff ect all members of the hierarchy in 
ways that perpetuate the established order.13
For example, when a faculty member is hired on the tenure track, he is hired 
with the strong presumption that he will succeed. It is almost unheard of that 
he would be “demoted” to Standard 405(c) status. The diff erence this makes 
on a human level cannot be overstated; it simply feels diff erent (and better) to 
be hired with the enthusiasm and energy of that presumption of achievement. 
The confi rmation bias attending this is also real.14 The presumption of success 
means work—both scholarship and teaching—is viewed through that lens, by 
other faculty, by students, and by others. It gives a faculty member the real 
support of colleagues and the confi dence to succeed. That usually translates 
into more productivity and investment in the institution. I’m not saying 
that tenure-track faculty do not deserve this presumption, but rather that all 
faculty deserve it. And that our institutions and students deserve the kind of 
camaraderie and work that is encouraged by this presumption.
The opposite occurs for those hired on the “lesser” track of Standard 405(c). 
The performance of those in the lower ranks will be viewed through the lens 
of their inferior status. What scholarship is produced will likely be viewed 
skeptically and critically—confi rmation bias is at work here as well. Students 
10. See generally TODD S. PURDUM, AN IDEA WHOSE TIME HAS COME: TWO PARTIES, TWO PRESIDENTS 
AND THE BATTLE FOR THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 (2014); DONALD T. CRITCHLOW & NANCY 
MACLEAN, DEBATING THE AMERICAN CONSERVATIVE MOVEMENT: 1945 TO THE PRESENT 26–27 
(2009) (outlining Barry Goldwater’s objections to the Civil Rights bill). 
11. Across the board, empirical studies have shown that hierarchical structures led to lower 
satisfaction and morale and higher stress and anxiety. Anderson & Brown, supra note 6, at 64. 
The evidence of this is “robust.” Id.; see also Pfeff er & Langton, supra note 3, at 398, 402 (study 
of faculty wage disparity predicted lower productivity and lesser satisfaction).
12. Joe C. Magee & Adam D. Galinsky, Social Hierarchy: The Self-Reinforcing Nature of Power and Status, 
2 ACAD. MGMT. ANNALS 351, 365 (2008).
13. Id.
14. Indeed, research shows that people tend to overestimate the skills and abilities of those at the 
top of the hierarchical structure. Anderson & Brown, supra note 6, at 67.
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also absorb the message. Since students run the law reviews, clinicians and 
legal writing faculty likely won’t get a fair hearing from the highest-ranked 
law reviews. As a result, the skeptical views created by the hierarchy will be 
reinforced. In the classroom, students will tend not to give the benefi t of 
the doubt and may even be disrespectful or challenging, leading to poor 
evaluations and yet more “objective” evidence that inferior status is deserved. 
Again, this is so damaging on a human level, but also so damaging to the 
institution and its students.
Standard 405(c) also has serious emotional costs. It institutionally 
entrenches a group of people as “less than” their colleagues. This constant 
reminder that the workplace has decided that certain faculty aren’t as good, 
and never will be, damages self-conception. Faculty members on this track 
may begin to believe that they are less valuable. They may begin to believe 
they have nothing worth writing in scholarship, so they don’t try.15 They may 
not speak up at faculty meetings or committee meetings because they question 
the worth of their input.16 This is a real problem with entrenched hierarchies.17 
And it robs the institution of so much valuable input while also robbing the 
employees of their dignity and self-respect.
The discriminatory aspect of this hierarchy is even more troubling when 
we consider its intersection with race and gender, topics covered ably in other 
essays by my colleagues Mel Weresh, Kristen Tiscione, Ann McGinley, and 
Teri McMurtry-Chubb. Indeed, given what we know about the gender and 
race composition of law faculties, upon close inspection it gets harder and 
harder to justify that “diff erent hiring criteria” argument. Professors Weresh, 
McGinley and McMurtry-Chubb make clear that Standard 405(c) takes 
advantage of and perpetuates the structural sexism and racism of our society. 
This should make us very, very uncomfortable. 
Standard 405(c) is also damaging to those at the top of the hierarchy.18 Power 
“fundamentally transforms how an individual construes and approaches the 
15. Id. at 66 (aggregating studies showing hierarchy suppressed input by low-ranking group 
members and overvalued input by higher-ranking group members); id. at 76 (lower rank 
reduces self-perception and makes people feel they have less to contribute) (aggregating 
studies).
16. Studies have “consistently shown” that lower-ranked employees stay silent instead of raising 
important issues. Psychologists describe what they call “paranoid social cognition” among 
those in the lower ranks of an organizational hierarchy. This is evidenced by anxiety, mistrust, 
and suspiciousness, especially of those in the higher ranks. The result is a reluctance to 
communicate. Id. at 78.
17. Magee & Galinsky, supra note 12, at 370–71. In a study of interactions between tenured and 
untenured faculty, tenured professors were less accurate in assessing and interpreting the 
comments of their untenured colleagues (citing Dacher Keltner & Robert J. Robinson, 
Defending the Status Quo: Power and Bias in Social Confl ict, 23 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 
1066, 1075–76 (1997)).
18. Anderson & Brown, supra note 6, at 74 (“giving individuals power can make them less 
accurate in perceiving others and more likely to rely on stereotypes” and biased thinking 
when judging others) (citing studies).
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world.” Specifi cally, those in the higher ranks are more likely to view those in 
the lower ranks less as individuals and more in terms of group characteristics or 
stereotypes.19 This is not to say that tenured faculty are bad people or bigoted, 
but that we are all human.20 And hierarchy, especially if based on categorical 
structures, is “sneaky.” It aff ects our worldview in many ways without our even 
realizing it.21 It changes our mind-sets in ways that I think all of us can agree 
is not anything to aspire to.
Standard 405(c) also makes intrastatus friendships and collaboration 
diffi  cult.22 It creates a system in which tenured faculty, however well-intentioned 
or kind, may treat contract faculty diff erently. I confess that I have been guilty 
of this on occasion myself since I’ve received tenure. It is just so hard not to 
when you are at meetings others cannot attend or privy to decision-making 
that others are not part of. 
The bottom line is that Standard 405(c) fosters exclusionary thinking. 
People may say hurtful things and not even notice that the statements are 
inappropriate.23 For example, I have seen well-meaning tenured faculty simply 
forget that clinicians or legal writing faculty are faculty and thus not include 
them when speaking about what faculty do or teach. Or leave them out of 
email discussions. I don’t think this is malicious. It is just the natural human 
result of the divisiveness created by a status hierarchy like Standard 405(c).
Conclusion
For all these reasons, I think Standard 405(c) as it is currently implemented 
is a very fl awed rule, damaging to law schools, students, and all faculty, 
tenured and nontenured. We simply shouldn’t have a faculty hierarchy based 
on generalizations and stereotypes. We especially shouldn’t have such a thing 
if there is any chance that such a hierarchy reinforces or takes advantage of 
structural racism or patriarchy.
I recognize that status evolution is a gradual process starting with small 
steps. And I laud Professor Weresh for a thoughtful and commendable step 
19. Magee & Galinsky, supra note 12, at 370–71.
20. Indeed, many tenured law professors are not only wonderful people, but committed to 
social justice and eradicating discrimination. In some ways, this can exacerbate the problems 
created by Standard 405(c)—if we are committed to social justice and are confronted with 
a discriminatory status hierarchy, we might be more likely to look for justifi cations to 
legitimatize that hierarchy so we can live with ourselves. See, e.g., Eddie Harmon-Jones, A 
Cognitive Dissonance Theory Perspective on Persuasion, in THE PERSUASION HANDBOOK: DEVELOPMENTS 
IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 99, 102–03 (James Price Dillard & Michael Pfau eds., 2002); 
KATHLEEN KELLEY REARDON, PERSUASION: THEORY AND CONTEXT 68–69 (1981).
21. Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination 
and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1188 (1995).
22.  See Anderson & Brown, supra note 6, at 57, 77-78; Pfeff er & Langton, supra note 3, at 382, 388 
(wage dispersion negatively aff ects cooperation and collaboration).
23. Anderson & Brown, supra note 6, at 74 (people in higher-ranking positions less likely to be 
polite and more likely to violate social norms).
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forward. But even with a “best practices” document, I cannot defend ABA 
Standard 405(c) the way it is implemented now. I think we can, and should, 
do better.
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